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1. The shift in the institutional logics of corporate governance towards shareholder value 
('Great Reversal in Corporate Governance') coupled with shareholdership's increasing short-
terrnism ('Great Reversal in Shareholdership') have cumulatively contributed to the low rates 
of GDP growth that are observed in five major Western economies (France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, UK, US) since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of monetary 
arrangements in the early 1970s. 
2. Corporate law has been an accomplice for the reorientation of corporate governance towards 
shareholder value, i.e. for the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance, and thus it indirectly 
shares the blame for the low rates of capital accumulation that have thrown the five major 
Western economies in a stagnation mode over the past four decades. 
3, Corporate law rules have escalated the divestment of structurally long-termist institutional 
investors from equity positions and have preserved the trend towards shareholder short-
termism that other legal and extra-legal institutions have directly caused. Corporate law has 
thus sustained the Great Reversal in Shareholdership and hence it has contributed to the 
maintenance of the second factor that brought about the observed low rates of growth in the 
five major Western economics over the past four decades. 
4. Corporate governance should be restructured along the lines of a new normative legal 
concept 'Long Governance'. Long Governance rebuts the assumption of shareholder 
homogeneity and claims that shareholders should be classified into groups, so that more 
powers are distributed to the long-terrnist shareholders. Nevertheless, because of the fact 
that the vast majority of non-controlling shareholders of listed corporations are short-
terrnists, one of the foremost regulatory goals of Long Governance should be to provide 
incentives to the investor community, so that the pool of long-termist shareholders, which 
will be empowered, can eventually be increased. 
5. Corporate law lies at the heart of the organization of the capitalist system, since it regulates 
the corporation, where the production function and the capital accumulation process take 
place. It follows that every crisis of capitalism reveals a failure of corporate law. 
6. The greatest failure of the finance-led model of capitalism - and therefore of corporate law -
is that the stock market has transformed from a mechanism to fmance the supply side of the 
economy (i.e. the industry) into a mechanism that fmances the consumption side (i.e. stock 
portfolios function as a complement to falling real wages). Corporate law should introduce 
the appropriate mechanisms so that the character of the stock market changes again. 
7. Short-term capital is of pro-cyclical nature. To the extent that corporate law sustains the 
existence and proliferation of short-term capital, it should be viewed as deepening economic 
cnses. 
8. The fundamental debate of corporate governance, i.e. shareholder value vs. stakeholder value 
is a dead-end. An intermediate 'third way' that would focus on the importance of long-term 
shareholder value ('Long Governance') has the potential of conciliating the desiderata of both 
shareholderism and stakeholderism. 
9. The ongoing economic crisis was initiated by the burst of the bubble in the US real estate 
sector and the concomitant collapse of the shadow banking sector in the US. In essence, 
failed bets in these sectors produced negative externalities for other market players and that 
exposes a structural pathology of capitalism and of the neoliberal approach to the regulation 
of the financial sector. 
10. The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the EU cannot be cured by the introduction of austerity 
plans in heavily indebted states. Austerity might be trying to save money, so that debt is 
serviced, but at the same time it removes liquidity from the real economy throwing the latter 
in a recession. Recession in turn drives the debt to GDP ratio of a country up, which is the 
most common metric of sovereign debt sustainability. That in turn requires more austerity 
measures to be taken, so that the country can service its debt; in turn greater recession is 
marked. This creates a death spiral for the economy, upon which austerity has been imposed. 
11. The European Fiscal Compact effectively outlaws Keynesian policies that have historically 
been the only proven remedies to fight recessions. States are effectively deprived from their 
historical ability to help their economies recover from crises. 
12. The Eurozone can never recover from its problems without the creation of an official 
Surplus Recycling Mechanism that will automatically tunnel funds (not in the form of debt) 
from countries that are in a fiscal surplus to countries that are in a deficit. Otherwise in a 
monetary union surpluses and deficits have the tendency to be persistent in the countries, in 
which they have emerged and eventually the deficit countries will be forced to exit the 
common currency so that they can reintroduce their national currency and depreciate it. 
